We study a multi-player one-round game termed Stackelberg Network Pricing Game, in which a leader can set prices for a subset of m priceable edges in a graph. The other edges have a fixed cost. Based on the leader's decision one or more followers optimize a polynomial-time solvable combinatorial minimization problem and choose a minimum cost solution satisfying their requirements based on the fixed costs and the leader's prices. The leader receives as revenue the total amount of prices paid by the followers for priceable edges in their solutions. Our model extends several known pricing problems, including single-minded and unit-demand pricing, as well as Stackelberg pricing for certain follower problems like shortest path or minimum spanning tree. Our first main result is a tight analysis of a single-price algorithm for the single follower game, which provides a (1 + ε) log m-approximation. This can be extended to provide a (1 + ε)(log k + log m)-approximation for the general problem and k followers. The problem is also shown to be hard to approximate within O(log ε k + log ε m) for some ε > 0. If followers have demands, the single-price algorithm provides an O(m 2 )-approximation, and the problem is hard to approximate within O(m ) for some ε > 0. Our second main result is a polynomial time algorithm An extended abstract of this paper has appeared in STACS 2008 [11] .
for revenue maximization in the special case of Stackelberg bipartite vertex-cover, which is based on non-trivial max-flow and LP-duality techniques. This approach can be extended to provide constant-factor approximations for any constant number of followers.
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Introduction
Algorithmic pricing problems model the task of assigning revenue maximizing prices to a retailer's set of products given some estimate of the potential customers' preferences in purely computational [19] , as well as strategic [3] settings. Previous work in this area has mostly focused on settings in which these preferences are rather restricted, in the sense that products are either pure complements [2, 9, 20, 21] and every customer is interested in exactly one subset of products or pure substitutes [1, 10, 15, [19] [20] [21] , in which case each customer seeks to buy only a single product out of some set of alternatives. A customer's real preferences, however, are often significantly more complicated than that and therefore pose some additional challenges.
The modelling of consumer preferences has received considerable attention in the context of algorithmic mechanism design [25] and combinatorial auctions [16] . The established models range from relatively simple bidding languages to bidders that are represented by oracles allowing certain types of queries, e.g., revealing the desired bundle of items given some fixed set of prices. The latter would be a somewhat problematic assumption in the theory of pricing algorithms, where we usually assume to have access to a rather large number of potential customers through some sort of sampling procedure and, thus, are interested in preferences that allow for a compact kind of representation.
In this paper we focus on customers that have non-trivial preferences, yet can be fully described by their types and budgets and do not require any kind of oracles. We consider the framework of Stackelberg pricing [30] , which models scenarios that arise naturally in a variety of combinatorial pricing problems in practice. This approach originates in the operations research literature [24] .
For instance, consider a simple pricing problem to optimally set tolls in a traffic network. There is a company that owns a certain subset of road segments (like speedways or private highways) on which the company can set prices. Customers are cars travelling between their source and destination through the network. Let us disregard effects of congestion and assume that every non-priceable edge has a fixed publicly known cost, which could come from a (constant) travel time or a toll that a competitor company places on this edge. Customers are rational, i.e., they choose a shortest path with respect to the sum of edge costs on the path. How can the company price their road segments in order to achieve highest revenue?
As another example consider a telecommunication company that provides certain connections in a network. In the market there are competitors of this company that operate similar or different connections, for which users must pay fixed publicly known prices. In this case possible customers are interested in establishing connections via the network (e.g., setting up telephone or Internet connections) for which they must pay the corresponding prices. Again, as customers are acting rationally, they are going to purchase the cheapest set of connections that meets their communication requirement. How can the company set prices for the connections such that it receives the highest revenue from the customers?
Note, that in both cases customer preferences are represented implicitly via some network design problem and the customers' objective of minimizing total cost. The revenue optimization problem is then to manipulate the prices of network edges to obtain the largest share of revenue in the optimum solution of the customer. In general, this approach of defining customer preferences implicitly in terms of some optimization problem is the characteristic of Stackelberg pricing. In the standard 2-player form we are given a leader setting the prices on a subset of network elements and a follower seeking to purchase a min-cost network satisfying her requirements. In general, this gives rise to a bi-level optimization problem for the revenue of the leader. We proceed by formally defining the model before stating our results.
Model and Notation
In this paper we consider the following class of multi-player one-round games. Let G = (V , E) be a multi-graph. There are two types of players in the game, one leader and one or more followers. We consider two classes of edge and vertex games, in which either the edges or the vertices have costs. For most of the paper, we will consider edge games, but the definitions and results for vertex games are completely analogous. In an edge game, the edge set E is divided into two sets E = E p ∪ E f with E p ∩ E f = ∅. For the set of fixed-price edges E f there is a fixed cost c(e) ≥ 0 for each edge e ∈ E f . For the set of priceable edges E p the leader can specify a price p(e) ≥ 0 for each edge e ∈ E p . We denote the number of priceable edges by m = |E p |. Each follower i = 1, . . . , k has a set S i ⊂ 2 E of feasible subnetworks. The weight w(S) of a subnetwork S ∈ S i is given by the costs of fixed-price edges and the price of priceable edges,
The revenue r(S) of the leader from subnetwork S is given by the prices of the priceable edges that are included in S, i.e.,
Throughout the paper we assume that for any price function p every follower i can in polynomial time find a subnetwork S * i (p) of minimum weight. Hence, we further assume that the sets of S i are not part of the input but can be represented in a compact way, e.g., by a logic formula or a set of constraints that is polynomial in the size of G and k. Our interest is to find the pricing function p * for the leader that generates maximum revenue, i.e.,
We denote this maximum revenue by r * . To guarantee that the revenue is bounded and the optimization problem is non-trivial, we assume that there is at least one feasible subnetwork for each follower i that is composed only of fixed-price edges. In order to avoid technicalities, we assume w.l.o.g. that among subnetworks of identical weight the follower always chooses the one with higher revenue for the leader. In general we will refer to the revenue optimization problem by STACK.
Problem STACK Given a graph G = (V , E), a subset E p ⊂ E of priceable edges, fixed costs c(e) for e ∈ E − E p , and k followers with follower i specified by a compact representation of her feasible subnetworks S i ⊆ 2 E , find prices p(e) for all e ∈ E p such that the revenue k i=1 r(S * i (p)) is maximized.
It is not difficult to see that for games with k = 1 follower, we need a follower with a large number of feasible subnetworks in order to make STACK interesting. Proposition 1 Given follower j and a fixed subnetwork S j ∈ S j , we can compute prices p with w(S j ) = min S∈S j w(S) maximizing r(S j ) or decide that such prices do not exist in polynomial time. For STACK with k = 1 follower, if |S| = O(poly(m)), then revenue maximization can be done in polynomial time.
Proof Fix follower j and subnetwork S j ∈ S j . We formulate the problem of extracting maximum revenue from S j as the following LP, where variable x e defines the price of edge e ∈ E p : max.
x e ≥ 0.
Constraints (2) require that S j is the cheapest feasible network for follower j , formally w(S j ) ≤ w(S) for all feasible networks S ∈ S j . Clearly the number of these constraints might be exponential in m. However, by our assumption we can compute the min-cost subnetwork for any given set of prices and, thus, have a polynomial time separation oracle. Now assume that |S| = O(poly(m)) for an instance of STACK with k = 1 follower. By enumerating all S ∈ S and optimizing revenue for each subnetwork separately, we obtain a polynomial time algorithm.
Note, that our definition of Stackelberg pricing generalizes most of the previously employed models in algorithmic pricing. In particular, it is equivalent to item pricing with general valuation functions, a problem that has independently been considered in [4] . Every general valuation function can be expressed in terms of Stackelberg network pricing on graphs and our algorithmic results apply in this setting, as well.
While we will start by addressing the general case of STACK, we will also focus on more restricted variants, in which we can use the additional problem structure to show improved results. As an example we consider the bipartite Stackelberg vertex cover game. In this game we are given a bipartite graph
Hence, the game is defined as a vertex game rather than an edge game. Each follower seeks to purchase a min-cost vertex cover of some subset of the graph's edges E. In particular, follower i has a set E i ⊆ E of edges, and her feasible subsets S i ⊆ 2 V are the subsets of vertices that form vertex covers of E i . The weight w(S) of a subset S ∈ S i is again given by
The revenue r(S) of the leader is given by the prices of the priceable vertices included in S, i.e.,
Note that the set S i of all vertex covers for a follower i can be described by a number of linear constraints that is polynomial in the size of G. For any price function p follower i can in polynomial time find a minimum-weight vertex cover S * i (p) for E i using a well-known algorithm based on max-flow computations. Our interest is to find the pricing function p * for the leader that generates maximum revenue.
Problem STACKVC Given a bipartite graph G = (V , E), a subset V p of priceable vertices, fixed costs c(v) for v ∈ V − V p , and k followers with follower i specified by edge set E i ⊆ E, find prices p(v) for all v ∈ V p such that the revenue k i=1 r(S * i (p)) is maximized.
Previous Work and New Results
The single-follower shortest-path Stackelberg pricing problem (STACKSP) has first been considered by Labbé et al. [24] , who derive a bilevel LP formulation of the problem and prove NP-hardness. Roch et al. [26] present a first polynomial time approximation algorithm with a provable performance guarantee, which yields logarithmic approximation ratios. Bouhtou et al. [6] extend the problem to multiple (weighted) followers and present algorithms for a restricted shortest path problem on parallel links. For an overview of most of the initial work on Stackelberg network pricing the reader is referred to [29] . A different variant called the shortest-path-tree game, in which a customer purchases the shortest path tree from a node to every other node in the network, was studied by Biló et al. [5] . They solve the pricing problem optimally in time O(n 2 log n) for 2 priceable edges. A different line of research has been investigating the application of Stackelberg pricing to network congestion games in order to obtain low congestion Nash equilibria for sets of selfish followers [18, 22, 23, 27, 28, 31] .
Recently, Cardinal et al. [13] investigated the corresponding minimum spanning tree (STACKMST) game, again obtaining a logarithmic approximation guarantee and proving APX-hardness. Their single-price algorithm, which assigns the same price to all priceable edges, turns out to be even more widely applicable and yields similar approximation guarantees for any matroid based Stackelberg game. Very recently, in [14] they provided constant-factor approximation algorithms based on dynamic programming for STACKMST in the special case of planar and bounded-treewidth graphs.
The first result of our paper is a generalization of the single-price algorithm to general Stackelberg games. The previous limitation to matroids stems from the difficulty to determine the necessarily polynomial number of candidate prices that can be tested by the algorithm. We develop a novel characterization of the small set of threshold prices that need to be tested and obtain a polynomial time (1 + ε)H m -approximation (where H m denotes the mth harmonic number) for arbitrary ε > 0, which turns out to be perfectly tight for shortest path as well as minimum spanning tree games. This result is found in section Sect. 2.
We then extend the analysis to multiple followers, in which case the approximation ratio becomes (1 + ε)(H k + H m ). This can be shown to be essentially best possible by an approximation preserving reduction from single-minded combinatorial pricing [17] . Extending the problem even further, we also look at the case of multiple weighted followers, which arises naturally in network settings where different followers come with different routing demands. While previous upper-bounding techniques could not yield approximation guarantees essentially better than the number of followers in this scenario, we present an alternative analysis of the single-price algorithm that results in an approximation ratio of (1 + ε)m 2 . Additionally, we derive a lower bound of O(m ε ) for the weighted player case. This resolves a previously open problem from [6] . The results on multiple followers are found in Sect. 3.
The generic reduction from single-minded to Stackelberg pricing yields a class of networks in which we can price the vertices on one side of a bipartite graph and players aim to purchase minimum cost vertex covers for their sets of edges. This motivates us to return to the classical Stackelberg setting and consider the single-follower bipartite vertex-cover game (STACKVC). As it turns out, this variation of the game allows polynomial-time algorithms for exact revenue maximization using non-trivial algorithmic techniques. We first present an upper bound on the possible revenue in terms of the min-cost vertex-cover not using any priceable vertices and the minimum portion of fixed cost in any possible cover. Using iterated max-flow computations, we then determine a pricing with total revenue that eventually coincides with our upper bound. These results are found in Sect. 4.
Section 5 concludes and presents several intriguing open problems for further research.
A Single-Price Algorithm for a Single Follower
Let us assume that we are faced with a single follower and let c 0 denote the cost of a cheapest feasible subnetwork for the follower not containing any of the priceable edges. Clearly, we can compute c 0 by assigning price +∞ to all priceable edges and simulating the follower on the resulting network. The single-price algorithm proceeds as follows. For j = 0, . . . , log c 0 it assigns price p j = (1+ε) j to all priceable edges and determines the resulting revenue r(p j ). It then simply returns the pricing that results in maximum revenue. We present a logarithmic bound on the approximation guarantee of the single-price algorithm. Theorem 1 Given any ε > 0, the single-price algorithm computes an (1 + ε)H mapproximation for Stackelberg network pricing with respect to r * , the revenue of an optimal pricing.
Analysis
The single-price algorithm has previously been applied to a number of different combinatorial pricing problems [1, 20] . The main issue in analyzing its performance guarantee for Stackelberg pricing is to determine the right set of candidate prices. We first derive a precise characterization of these candidates and then argue that the geometric sequence of prices tested by the algorithm is a good enough approximation. Slightly abusing notation, we let p refer to both price p and the assignment of this price to all priceable edges. Consider the follower's cheapest feasible subnetworks S * (p) for different values of p. If there exists any feasible subnetwork that uses at least j priceable edges, we let
be the largest price at which such a subnetwork is chosen. If no feasible subnetwork with at least j priceable edges exists, we set θ j = 0. As we shall see, these thresholds are the key to prove Theorem 1.
We want to derive an alternative characterization of the values of θ j . For each 1 ≤ j ≤ m we let c j refer to the minimum sum of prices of fixed-price edges in any feasible subnetwork containing at most j priceable edges, formally
Note, that clearly c 0 ≥ c 1 ≥ · · · ≥ c m by definition. Now let j = c 0 − c j and consider the point set (0, 0 ), (1, 1 ), . . . , (m, m ) on the plane. By H we refer to a minimum selection of points spanning the upper convex hull of the point set. It is a straightforward geometric observation that we can define H as follows:
We now return to the candidate prices. By definition we have that θ 1 ≥ θ 2 ≥ · · · ≥ θ m . We say that θ j is true threshold value if θ j > θ j +1 , i.e., if at price θ j the subnetwork chosen by the follower contains exactly j priceable edges. Let i 1 < i 2 < · · · < i denote the indices, such that θ i k are true threshold values and for ease of notation define i 0 = 0. Lemma 1 θ j is true threshold value if and only if (j, j ) belongs to H.
Proof "⇒" Let θ j be true threshold value, i.e., at price θ j the chosen subnetwork contains exactly j priceable edges. We observe that at any price p the cheapest subnetwork containing j priceable edges has cost c j + j · p = c 0 − j + j · p. Thus, at price θ j it must be the case that j − j · θ j ≥ i − i · θ j for all i < j and
and, thus, we have that (j, j ) belongs to H. "⇐" Assume now that (j, j ) belongs to H and let
and, thus, the network chosen at price p cannot contain less than j priceable edges. Analogously, let k > j.
and, thus, the subnetwork chosen at price p contains exactly j priceable edges. We conclude that θ j is a true threshold.
It is not difficult to see that the price p defined in the second part of the proof of Lemma 1 is precisely the threshold value θ j . Let θ i k be any true threshold. Since
. We state this important fact, which is also illustrated in Fig. 1 , again in the following lemma.
From the fact that points (i 0 , i 0 ), . . . , (i , i ) define the convex hull we know that i = m , i.e., i is the largest of all -values. On the other hand, each j describes the maximum revenue that can be made from a subnetwork with at most j priceable edges and, thus, m is clearly an upper bound on the revenue made by an optimal price assignment. 
By definition of the θ j 's it is clear that at any price below θ i k the subnetwork chosen by the follower contains no less than i k priceable edges. Furthermore, for each θ i k the single-price algorithm tests a candidate price that is at most a factor (1 + ε) smaller than θ i k . Let r(p i k ), r(θ i k ) denote the revenue that results from assigning price p i k or θ i k to all priceable edges, respectively.
Finally, we know that the revenue made by assigning price θ i k to all priceable edges is r(θ i k ) = i k · θ i k . Let r denote the revenue of the single-price solution returned by the algorithm. We have:
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1. 
Tightness
The example in Fig. 2 shows that our analysis of the single-price algorithm's approximation guarantee is tight. The follower wants to buy a path connecting vertices s and t. In an optimal solution we set the price of edge e j to m/j . Then edges e 1 , . . . , e m form a shortest path of cost mH m . On the other hand, assume that all edges e 1 , . . . , e m are assigned the same price p. If p ≤ 1, the leader's revenue is clearly bounded by m; if p > m, the shortest path does not contain any priceable edge at all. Let then m/(j + 1) < p ≤ m/j for some 1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1. It is straightforward to argue that at this price a shortest path from s to t does not contain any of the priceable edges e j +1 , . . . , e m and, thus, it contains at most j priceable edges. It follows that the leader's revenue is at most j · p ≤ m. Similar argumentation clearly holds if the follower seeks to purchase a minimum spanning tree instead of a shortest path. The best known lower bound for single-follower Stackelberg pricing is found in [8] , where STACKSP is shown to be non-approximable within 2 − o (1) . For the spanning tree case the best lower bound is APX-hardness shown in [13] . To the authors' best knowledge, up to now no non-constant inapproximability results could be proven. We proceed by extending our results to multiple followers, in which case previous results on other combinatorial pricing problems yield strong lower bounds.
Extension to Multiple Followers
In this section we extend our results on general Stackelberg network pricing to scenarios with multiple followers. Recall that each follower j is characterized by her own collection S j of feasible subnetworks and k denotes the number of followers. Section 3.1 extends the analysis from the single follower case to prove a tight bound of (1 + ε)(H k + H m ) on the approximation guarantee of the single-price algorithm. Section 3.2 presents an alternative analysis that applies even in the case of weighted followers and yields approximation guarantees that do not depend on the number of followers. Section 3.3 derives (near) tight inapproximability results based on known hardness results for combinatorial pricing.
An (1 + ε)(H k + H m )-Approximation for Multiple Followers
Let an instance of Stackelberg network pricing with some number k ≥ 1 of followers be given. We extend the analysis from Sect. 2 to obtain a similar bound on the singleprice algorithm's approximation guarantee.
Theorem 2
The single-price algorithm computes an (1 + ε)(H k + H m )-approximation with respect to r * , the revenue of an optimal pricing, for Stackelberg network pricing with multiple followers.
Proof Consider graph G = (V , E), E = E f ∪ E p with |E p | = m, and k followers defined by collections S 1 , . . . , S k of feasible subnetworks. We transform this instance into a single follower pricing game as follows. Let G 1 , . . . , G k be identical copies of G and define G * = G 1 ∪ · · · ∪ G k . Furthermore, define a single follower by
i.e., for every follower j in the original instance our new follower seeks to purchase a subnetwork from S j in copy G j of the original graph. Clearly, the maximum possible revenue in the new instance is an upper bound on the maximum revenue in the multiple follower case, since we can always assign the same price to every copy of a priceable edge in G 1 , . . . , G k . Furthermore, every pricing returned by the singleprice algorithm on G 1 ∪ · · · ∪ G k translates naturally into a corresponding pricing of identical revenue in G, since again all copies of an edge from G are assigned identical prices. Finally, since the number of priceable edges in G 1 ∪ · · · ∪ G k is k · m, we obtain an approximation ratio of (1 + ε)H km as desired.
This reduction from the multiple to single follower case relies essentially on the fact that we are considering the single-price algorithm. Thus, the above does not imply anything about the relation of these two cases in general.
A (1 + ε)m 2 -Approximation for Weighted Followers
We now turn to an even more general variation of Stackelberg pricing, in which we allow multiple weighted followers. This model, which has been previously considered in [6] , arises naturally in the context of network pricing games with different demands for each player. Formally, for each follower we are given her demand d j ∈ R + 0 . Given followers buying subnetworks S 1 , . . . , S k , the leader's revenue is defined as It has been conjectured before that in the weighted case no approximation guarantee essentially beyond O(k ·log m) is possible. We show that an alternative analysis of the single-price algorithm yields ratios that do not depend on the number of followers.
Theorem 3
The single-price algorithm computes an (1 + ε)m 2 -approximation with respect to r * , the revenue of an optimal pricing, for Stackelberg network pricing with multiple weighted followers.
Proof Let again graph G = (V , E), E = E f ∪ E p with |E p | = m, and k followers defined by S 1 , . . . , S k and demands d 1 , . . . , d k be given and consider the optimal pricing p * . For each priceable edge, let F (e) refer to the set of followers purchasing e under price assignment p * and denote by r * (e) = j ∈F (e) d j p * (e) the corresponding revenue. Clearly, e∈E p r * (e) = r * .
Fix some priceable edge e and define a corresponding price p e = p * (e)/m. By r(p e ) we denote the revenue from assigning price p e to all priceable edges. Let j ∈ F (e) and assume that follower j buys subnetwork S j under price assignment p * . By w * (S j ), w e (S j ) and c(S j ) we refer to the total weight of S j under price assignments p * and p e and the weight due to fixed price edges only, respectively. It holds that
Let c j 0 denote the cost of a cheapest feasible subnetwork for follower j consisting only of fixed price edges. It follows that w e (S j ) ≤ w * (S j ) ≤ c j 0 and, thus, follower j is going to purchase a subnetwork containing at least one priceable edge under price assignment p e , resulting in revenue at least d j p e = d j p * (e)/m from this follower. We conclude that r(p e ) ≥ r * (e)/m and, thus Finally, observe that for each price p e the single-price algorithm checks some candidate price that is smaller by at most a factor of (1 + ε), which finishes the proof.
Lower Bounds
Hardness of approximation of Stackelberg pricing with multiple followers follows quite easily from known results about other combinatorial pricing models, which have received considerable attention lately. More formally, we will show lower bounds on the approximability of both weighted and unweighted multi-follower Stackelberg pricing games expressed in the number of priceable edges m and the number of followers k based on hardness of the unit-demand and single-minded envy-free pricing problems, respectively. Theorem 4 is based on a reduction from the unit-demand version of envy-free pricing. The resulting Stackelberg pricing game is an instance of the so-called river tarification problem, in which each player needs to route her demand along one out of a number of parallel links connecting her respective source and sink pair. This resolves an open problem from [6] .
Theorem 4
The Stackelberg network pricing problem with multiple weighted followers is hard to approximate within O(m ε ) for some ε > 0, unless NP ⊆ δ>0 BPTIME(2 O(n δ ) ). The same holds for the river tarification problem. for some ε > 0, unless NP ⊆ δ>0 BPTIME(2 O(n δ ) ) [7] . We can encode UDP-MIN in terms of a weighted multi-follower shortest-path Stackelberg pricing game in a directed graph in a straightforward way. For every product u ∈ U we define two vertices v u , w u and the directed priceable edge (v u , w u ). For each consumer c ∈ C we add vertices s c , t c , directed fixed-price edge (s c , t c ) of cost b c and directed fixed-price edges (s c , v u ), (w u , t c ) of cost 0 for every product u ∈ S c . We then define a follower seeking to route a total demand of d c = Pr D (c) along a shortest path from s c to t c .
Obviously the leader's revenue from assigning any prices to the priceable edges equals the expected revenue from assigning the same prices to the products of the UDP-MIN instance. Furthermore, the simple structure of the constructed graph satisfies the requirements of the river tarification problem from [6] . The construction is depicted in Fig. 3(a) .
In the unweighted case, a reduction from the single-minded version of the envyfree pricing problem yields lower bounds on the approximability of multi-follower Stackelberg pricing games. Theorem 5 shows that the single-price algorithm is essentially best possible in this situation. The resulting pricing game is an instance of bipartite Stackelberg Vertex Cover Pricing and, thus, yields the same result for this special case.
Theorem 5
The Stackelberg network pricing problem with multiple unweighted followers is hard to approximate within O(log ε k + log ε m) for some ε > 0, unless NP ⊆ δ>0 BPTIME (2 O(n δ ) ). In particular, this holds for bipartite Stackelberg Vertex Cover Pricing.
Proof We prove the theorem by a reduction from the single-minded envy-free pricing problem (SMP). In this problem, given a universe of products U , |U| = m, and a set of consumer samples C, |C| = k, consisting of budgets b c ∈ R + 0 and product sets S c ⊆ U , we need to find prices p : U → R + 0 maximizing the revenue
from sales to consumers C, where p(S c ) = u∈S c p(u) is shorthand notation for the sum of prices of products in S c . Intuitively, each consumer in SMP buys the whole set of products she is interested in, if the sum of prices does not exceed her budget. SMP is hard to approximate within O(log ε k + log ε m) for some ε > 0, unless NP ⊆ δ>0 BPTIME(2 O(n δ ) ) [17] . We encode SMP in terms of a Stackelberg vertex pricing game as follows. For every product u ∈ U we define a priceable vertex v u . For each consumer c ∈ C we add a fixed-price vertex w c of cost b c and edges {w c , v u } for every product u ∈ S c . We then define a follower seeking to purchase a min-cost vertex-cover for the edges connected to w c .
It is straightforward to check that the follower corresponding to consumer c in the SMP instance purchases the priceable vertices corresponding to the products in her set, if and only if their assigned prices sum to at most b c . We observe that the constructed graph is clearly bipartite and, furthermore, all priceable vertices are located on one side of the bipartition. The construction is illustrated in Fig. 3(b) .
We proceed by taking a closer look at STACKVC and especially focus on the interesting case of a single follower.
Stackelberg Vertex Cover
Stackelberg Vertex Cover Pricing is a vertex game. Nevertheless, the approximation results for the single-price algorithm, which are completely independent of the underlying network structure, continue to hold. In general the vertex-cover problem is hard and, consequently, we focus on settings in which the problem can be solved in polynomial time in order to stay within our definition of general Stackelberg network pricing games laid out in Sect. 1.1. In bipartite graphs the problem can be solved optimally by using a classic and fundamental max-flow/min-cut argumentation. If all priceable vertices are in one side of the partition, we have shown evidence that for multiple followers the single-price algorithm is essentially best possible. Our main result in this section is the fact that the problem can be solved exactly if there is only a single follower. This is despite the fact that the follower's set of feasible vertex covers might of course still be of exponential size and so the enumeration approach sketched in Section Proposition 1 is infeasible in this setting. A simple extension of our algorithm shows that general bipartite STACKVCwith a single follower can be approximated within a factor of 2.
Theorem 6 If for a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B, E) we have priceable vertices V p ⊆ A only, then there is a polynomial time algorithm computing an optimal price function p * for STACKVCwith a single follower.
Assume that the prices p(v) of all priceable vertices v ∈ V p are fixed. Lemma 3, which is essentially folklore by now, briefly describes how the follower can find a min-cost vertex-cover in this setting using a max-flow approach. Given the bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B, E) , we define the corresponding flow network G f as follows. We add a source s and a sink t to G and connect s to all vertices v ∈ A with directed edges (s, v), and t to all vertices v ∈ B with directed edges (v, t). Each such edge gets as capacity the price of the involved original vertex, i.e. Proof Let V A and V B the selections of vertices described above, i.e., V A contains all vertices v ∈ A for which no directed s-v-path exists in G r , V B contains all vertices v ∈ B for which such a path exists. We first argue that V A ∪ V B is indeed a feasible vertex-cover. Towards a contradiction, assume that there is an uncovered edge {v, w} in G, thus, v ∈ A\V A and w ∈ B\V B . Then there is an edge (v, w) of infinite capacity in G r . Since v ∈ A\V A , there is an s-v-path in G r and by adding edge (v, w) we obtain an s-w-path, as well. It follows that w ∈ V B , a contradiction.
Optimality of the constructed vertex-cover can be seen as follows. First, we observe that the cost of the vertex-cover equals the total value of flow f . This is immediate by considering the cut of G f defined by
and applying the max-flow/min-cut theorem. One can then argue that the max-flow problem on G f corresponds exactly to the dual of the LP-relaxation of the min-cost vertex-cover problem on G, and the claim follows. We omit the details of this part of the proof. 
yields an augmenting path P do 4 Increase p(v) and φ along P as much as possible.
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Algorithm 1 is based on the idea of computing a sequence of flows on network G f (see Fig. 4 ). Throughout the iterations, we interpret the flow on edge (s, v) for a priceable vertex v ∈ V p as the current price of v. As we will see, Algorithm 1 terminates with the optimum set of vertex prices. The key to the analysis lies in showing that at any time all priceable vertices are part of the min-cost vertex-cover. As we have argued before, this is equivalent to saying that all priceable vertices are in V A (disconnected from s in G r ) at all times. Proof The claim clearly holds in the initial round with p(v) = 0 for all v ∈ V p , since in this situation edge (s, v) has capacity 0 and all edges leaving v carry zero flow. We then only need to argue that the property is preserved through a single iteration of the algorithm.
We first observe that all computed flows are maximal with respect to the current capacities. To see this, note, that in each iteration the capacity of a single edge and the overall flow are increased by the same margin. Maximality is then immediate by the max-flow/min-cut theorem.
It follows that before and after each iteration, there is no augmenting path in G r and, thus, G r is disconnected. Now assume that in an iteration the algorithm increases the capacity of edge (s, v) for a given v ∈ V p and this yields an augmenting path P = (s, v, w 1 , . . . , w k , t). Since there was no s-t-path before increasing the capacity on (s, v), there is no other s-w 1 -path except the one through v. This implies that assigning flow to edge (v, w 1 ) does not create an s-v-path in G r . The exact same argument can be applied to any other priceable vertex on the augmenting path, and the claim follows.
We denote n = |V p | and again use the values c j for 1 ≤ j ≤ n to denote the minimum sum of prices of fixed-price vertices in any feasible vertex-cover containing at most j priceable vertices. Then, j = c 0 − c j are again upper bounds on the revenue that can be extracted from a network that includes at most j priceable vertices. For the optimal achievable revenue r * we have r * ≤ n .
When computing the maximum flow on G f holding all p(v) = 0, we get an initial flow of c n . In order to prove optimality of Algorithm 1, we now only need to calculate the value of the flow computed in the final iteration. By C ALG we refer to the min-cost vertex-cover with respect to the prices computed by the algorithm. C 0 and C n denote the min-cost vertex-covers with the prices of all priceable vertices set to +∞ or 0, respectively.
Proof of Theorem 6 Suppose that after executing Algorithm 1 we increase p(v) above φ(s, v) for every priceable vertex v. As we are at the end of the algorithm, this does not create any augmenting path and, thus, does not allow us to increase the flow any further. Consequently, the adjustment creates slack capacity on all the edges (s, v) with v ∈ V p and causes all priceable vertices to leave C ALG . The new cover must be the cheapest cover that excludes all priceable vertices, i.e., it must be C 0 and have cost c 0 . As we have not increased the flow, this implies that the cost of C ALG is also c 0 .
As we have argued before, the vertex-cover corresponding to the initial flow with p(v) = 0 for all v ∈ V p was C n of cost c n . As all flow increase in the while-loop was made over priceable vertices and all the priceable vertices stay in the cover, the revenue of C ALG must be c 0 − c n = n . This is an upper bound on the optimum revenue, and hence the prices found by the algorithm are optimal.
Notice that adjusting the price of the priceable vertices in each iteration is very convenient for the analysis, but not necessary for the algorithm to work. We can start with computing C n and for the remaining while-loop set all prices to +∞. This will result in the desired flow, which directly generates the final price for every vertex v as flow on (s, v). Hence, we can get optimal prices with an adjusted run of the standard polynomial time algorithm for maximum flow in G f . This proves Theorem 6.
In the next theorem we note that for the general bipartite case we can get a 2approximation for the optimum revenue. Theorem 7 Algorithm 2 is a 2-approximation algorithm for bipartite STACKVC, and the analysis of the ratio is tight.
Algorithm 2: A 2-approximation algorithm for STACKVC in bipartite graphs
Return p A or p B , depending on which one yields more revenue. 5 Proof Note that by setting p A (v) = ∞ for all priceable vertices of B, we increase their price over the prices in the optimum solution. This obviously allows us to extract more revenue from the vertices in A than p * . The same argument applies for the vertices in B and p B . Hence, the sum of both revenues is an upper bound on r * , and our algorithm delivers a 2-approximation by preserving the greater of the two.
For a tight example consider a path (v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , v 4 , v 5 ). The first vertex v 1 is a priceable vertex, then there are two fixed-price vertices v 2 and v 3 of cost 1 and 0, respectively. v 4 is priceable vertex, and v 5 has fixed cost 1. The optimum prices are p(v 1 ) = p(v 3 ) = 1. This yields the cover C * = {v 1 , v 3 , v 4 } and generates a revenue of 2. A solution returned by the algorithm, however, is e.g. p(v 1 ) = 1 and p(v 2 ) = ∞ (or vice versa), and hence generates only a revenue of 1.
We conclude the section with a lower bound and show that bipartite STACKVC with a small number of followers is NP-hard. Theorem 8 It is weakly NP-hard to compute revenue maximizing prices for bipartite STACKVC with
• priceable vertices in one partition and at least three followers • on a tree with priceable vertices in both partitions and at least two followers.
Proof We reduce from PARTITION, and the reduction is similar to the one used in [9] to show hardness of the highway pricing problem. For an instance of PARTITION given by integers A = {a 1 , . . . , a n } we introduce n element gadgets. An element gadget consists of a path of four edges, in which two vertices are priceable (see Fig. 5a ). All non-priceable vertices have fixed cost a i . The two outer edges belong to one follower, the two interior edges to a second follower. The vertices of different element gadgets will not be directly connected in the final construction, hence we can merge these followers into a total of two for all gadgets. By repeating arguments of [9] we observe that in the element gadget of a i we can at most extract a revenue of 2a i . In particular, follower 1 will purchase exactly one vertex for each of her edges. Here we can obtain a revenue of 2a i by setting each price to a i . Follower 2 will either purchase one fixed cost vertex, or both priceable vertices. In this case we can obtain a total revenue from both followers by setting two prices that sum up to a i . Hence, the crucial decision is whether the prices in the gadget shall sum to 2a i or to a i . In order to coordinate these decisions, we introduce a third coordination follower, who owns a star with a root vertex of fixed cost 3 2 i a i . The leaves of the star are all priceable vertices from all element gadgets (see Fig. 5b ). In total, we can now gain at i a i in revenue, 2 i a i from the followers in the element gadgets and the rest from the coordination follower. Suppose the instance A of PARTITION has a solution S ⊂ A such that a i ∈S a i = a i ∈S a i . Then it is possible to obtain r max as follows. We decide to set the prices to equal a i for all vertices in the element gadgets of a i ∈ S. For the remaining gadgets we set the prices to a i /2. This extracts a revenue of 2a i from each gadget and the full 3 2 i a i from the coordination follower. On the other hand, it is easy to verify that whenever we obtain r max , we must decide for each gadget, in which way we intend to obtain the revenue of 2a i . In order to extract all possible revenue from the coordination follower, the set of gadgets with prices set to a i will compose a solution to the PARTITION instance. This completes the first reduction.
For the second part we replace the element gadgets by a path of length five owned by a single follower. The priceable vertices are located in both of the bipartitions (see Fig. 5c ). All fixed price vertices have cost a i . Observe that the follower has only 5 reasonable covers to choose from. If both prices are less than a i , the follower will pick one of two covers including both priceable vertices. If one or both priceable vertices have cost more than a i , the follower will include only the cheaper vertex in his cover. Finally, if both vertices have price more than 2a i , none of the priceable vertices will be bought. An optimum revenue of 2a i can again be obtained in two ways: by setting prices of a i or 2a i to both vertices. Finally, we complete the construction with a coordination player, who owns a star that connects to one priceable vertex of each element gadget (see Fig. 5d ). The rest of the argument follows with similar observations as before. In particular, in order to obtain the maximum revenue of 7 2 i a i , the underlying instance of PARTITION must admit a solution. This completes the proof of the theorem.
Open Problems
In the model of Stackelberg games there are a number of important open problems that arise from our work. First, and foremost, we believe that the single-price algorithm is essentially best possible even for the single follower case and general Stackelberg pricing games. However, there is no matching logarithmic lower bound for this case. The best known lower bound to date is the constant factor inapproximability presented in [8] .
In addition, we believe that for the most general case of weighted followers a better bound than m 2 is possible. It remains an open problem how to tighten the gap between this bound and the (m ε ) lower bound we observed.
More generally, extending other fundamental algorithm design techniques to cope with pricing problems is a major open problem. We have shown here how ideas related to LP-duality can be used in the case of bipartite vertex-cover. It remains to be shown if these ideas can be adjusted to cope with minimum cut or more general graph partitioning problems.
Another interesting issue that we explored in [12] is to examine problems, in which customers cannot efficiently optimize over the set of feasible subnetworks. This is obviously the case in many non-trivial practical (network) optimization problems. To obtain a solution followers must resort to approximation algorithms, and pricing for such computationally bounded customers exhibits fundamentally different properties than the ones we observed here. It is an interesting open problem to extend the results in [12] for Min-Knapsack and general vertex cover problems to more general scenarios.
